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I. Introduction
The people's government, made for the people, made by the
people, and answerable to the people.'
A government of the people-this concept is a central underpin-
ning of democracy. It is embedded within the provisions of the
United States Constitution and permeates the public's perception of
the government. This concept has been a driving force in the creation
of the public access doctrine2 and the ongoing legal debate regarding
the scope of its application to judicial proceedings and records.
Subsection 107(a)3  of the United States Bankruptcy
Code4 embraces the conventional understanding of the public access
doctrine by creating a presumption in favor of public access to all pa-
pers filed in a bankruptcy case as well as to bankruptcy court dockets.
The legal precedent for implementing such a presumption of public
access is found in the First Amendment and the common law right of
access. The incorporation of this presumption into the Bankruptcy
Code furthers the underlying goals of the public access doctrine: "[en-
hancement of] popular trust in the fairness of the justice system, [pro-
motion of] .public participation in the workings of the government,
and [protection of] constitutional guarantees."5
1. Daniel Webster, Second Speech on Foote's Resolution (Jan. 26, 1830), in THE
SHORTER BARTLETT'S QUOTATIONs 419 (Christopher Morley et al. eds., 1965).
2. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978), the Court
recognized "a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents" and court
"supervisory power over [their] own records and files." The Court further recognized that
"the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discre-
tion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case."
Id. at 599.
3. Section 107 provides:
§ 107. Public access to papers
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a paper filed in a case
under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open
to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.
(b) On request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall, and on the bank-
ruptcy court's own motion, the bankruptcy court may-
(1) protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential research,
development, or commercial information; or
(2) protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter con-
tained in a paper filed in a case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 107 (1993).
4. Id. §§ 101-1330 (1993 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
5. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. RIv. 427,429 (1991) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
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The right of public access codified in subsection 107(a) is not ab-
solute,6 and, accordingly, the presumption of public access is a rebut-
table presumption. Specifically, subsection 107(b) sets out two
exceptions to the presumption established in subsection 107(a). It is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether an excep-
tion applies in any given circumstance.7 However, subsection 107(b)
states that "[o]n the request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy
court shall"8 protect the party if either of the subsection 107(b) excep-
tions is applicable.
The mandatory language of section 107 and the actions taken by
bankruptcy courts pursuant to this mandate raise constitutional ques-
tions with respect to the First Amendment. This Article explores the
constitutional dilemma posed to a bankruptcy judge faced with a re-
quest under subsection 107(b) and proposes an interpretation of sec-
tion 107 that does not infringe upon First Amendment guarantees.
Part HE of the Article analyzes the development of the public access
doctrine and the constitutional implications of its codification in sec-
tion 107. Part III describes the various approaches taken by courts to
implement section 107 and discusses categories of information that
qualify for protection under subsection (b). Part IV suggests a consti-
tutional reading of section 107, employing a case study of Phar-Mor,
Inc. v. Defendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.).9 The
Article concludes by proposing an approach to section 107 of the
6. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,509 (1984) ("Closed pro-
ceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that
outweighs the value of openness.") [hereinafter Press-Enterprise 1]; Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) ("It is uncontested, however, that the right to
inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute."); see also Diane Apa, Common Law
Right of Public Access-The Third Circuit Limits Its Expansive Approach to the Common-
Law Right of Public Access to Judicial Records, 39 ViLL. L. Rnv. 981, 982-85 (1994); John
E. Joiner, Constitutional Law Survey: Commercial Speech, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 613, 619-20
(1995); Miller, supra note 5, at 429; Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the
Information Age: The Need for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30
U.S.F. L. REv. 95, 141 n.219 (1995) and cases cited therein; Dane A. Drobny, Note, Death
TV: Media Access to Executions Under the First Amendment, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1179, 1184-
87 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-99 (stating that, in the common law right-of-access
context, "the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case"); In re Epic Assocs. V, 54 B.R. 445, 450 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (applying the stan-
dard of discretion recognized by the Supreme Court in Nixon in the bankruptcy context
under section 107).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1993) (emphasis added).
9. 191 B.R. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
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Bankruptcy Code which is both practical and within constitutional
bounds.
H. The Development of Section 107
The legal rights embodied in section 107 arise from Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Section 107 is a composite of various public ac-
cess principles cultivated by the United States Supreme Court in nu-
merous decisions that implicate both the First Amendment and the
common law right of access. Likewise, the exceptions to public access
provided for in the Bankruptcy Code have a rich heritage in Supreme
Court decisions as well as in the Supreme Court's former Rules of
Equity.
A. The Public Access Doctrine Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, and the right of association from most forms of government
interference. 10 The rights guaranteed in the First Amendment "share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government."'" A right of pub-
lic access to judicial proceedings is derived from this core purpose.
Conducting open trials is believed to foster public trust in the judicial
system and to enhance public discussion of government affairs. Thus,
"the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing
alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors
which ha[ve] long been open to the public."'12
The First Amendment right of public access originated in the con-
text of criminal trials. The practice of holding criminal trials open to
public scrutiny is deeply rooted in our legal heritage.' 3 Allowing the
public to observe the operation of justice in the criminal context was
believed to "serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
12. Id at 576.
13. The First Amendment right-of-access cases "have been rooted in the historic com-
mon law public character of criminal proceedings since the Norman Conquest in England
and the United States Constitution as an 'indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American
trial."' United States v. Hurley (In re Globe Newspaper Co.), 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir.
1990) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569); see also James J. Mangan & Ste-
phen R. Heifetz, Sixth Amendment at Trial, 83 GEo. L.J. 1190, 1191 n.2008 (1995) and cases
cited therein; Sandra Sanders, Note, Arizona's Public Records Laws and the Technology
Age: Applying "Paper" Laws to Computer Records, 37 ARIZ. L. Rnv. 931, 936-37 (1995)
("The right of public access to court hearings has a strong historical background.").
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outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion."' 4 Such prac-
tice was common in both America and England prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This widely accepted
practice was recognized by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia.'5 In that case, the Court affirmed that the guar-
antees of the First Amendment encompassed the tradition of public
access to criminal trials.
Subsequent to Richmond Newspapers, the Court decided a trilogy
of cases in which it reaffirmed its holding in Richmond Newspapers 6
and expanded it to cover voir dire proceedings' 7 as well as preliminary
hearings in a criminal action.' 8 The Court used a two-step analysis to
assess whether the particular proceeding warranted First Amendment
protection under the presumption of public access. In the first step of
this analysis, the Court considered whether the particular proceeding
had been traditionally open to public observation.' 9 In the second
step, the Court analyzed the particular proceeding to determine the
import of public access to the particular documents on public discus-
sion and scrutiny of government affairs."0 In sum, if the proceeding
has been traditionally open to the public and public access furthers the
democratic process, public access to the proceeding is protected by the
First Amendment.2'
The presumption of public access is rebuttable. In evaluating
cases under the First Amendment presumption of public access, the
standard of review exercised by the Supreme Court is one of strict
scrutiny.' The government or party seeking to close the proceedings
must demonstrate that "the denial [of the right of access] is necessi-
14. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Rich-
mond Newspapers provides a detailed account of the history of open criminal trials. See id.
at 564-74.
15. See id, at 580 & n.17; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604
(1982) ("The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while
not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless nec-
essary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights." (citing Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 579-80 & n.16)).
16. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596.
17. See Press-Enterprise I, supra note 6.
18. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise II].
19. See id. at 8; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605.
20. See Press-Enterprise II, supra note 18, at 8-9; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
21. See Richard J. Ovelman, The Year's Access Developments, 399 PRAcricrNG L.
INsT. 7, 19-25 (1994). For a critical review of the Court's two-step analysis in public access
cases, see Judge Kimba M. Wood, Re-examining the Access Doctrine, COMM. LAW., Winter
1994, at 3.
22. See Ovelman, supra note 21, at 23.
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tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. '23 To date, the Court has not rendered a public
access decision in which the opposing party has satisfied this burden.24
Thus, little guidance can be extracted from the Court's existing public
access decisions. However, a vast volume of public access cases has
been decided by the lower courts, and factors such as a defendant's
right to a fair trial,25 the protection of privileged information,26 and
privacy interests of the parties2 7 have on occasion trumped the pub-
lic's presumptive right of access under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court decisions in the public access arena evidence
that public access to criminal trials is a well-settled principle. Never-
theless, the Court has not pronounced its position on the application
of the First Amendment presumption of public access to noncriminal
23. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-09 (expanding on the latter element, that the
remedy be narrowly tailored to address the harm, the Court stated that all reasonable
alternatives to closure must be exhausted and the trial court must pronounce specific find-
ings of fact to support its conclusion). The standard of review for public access cases was
stated slightly differently in Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II in that the Court
required the party opposing closure to demonstrate an "overriding" rather than "compel-
ling" interest. See Press-Enterprise I, supra note 6, at 510; Press-Enterprise II, supra note
18, at 9-10.
24. Although the Supreme Court has not elaborated on the compelling interest stan-
dard in the public access context, the Court has addressed this standard in a variety of
other contexts related to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Ad-
visory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (acknowledging that "compliance with the
Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based re-
strictions on speech," but holding that the Establishment Clause was not implicated by
permitting a private party to display a cross on government property); Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992) (finding that the state's interest in preventing voter intimidation and
election fraud was compelling and justified statute which restricted distribution of cam-
paign materials at polling places); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (recognizing a
compelling state interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors
which justified statute prohibiting access and viewing of child pornography); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the government's interest in controlling dis-
cipline and uniformity in the military was compelling in face of challenge based upon the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause).
25. See United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing cases) (explaining
the various interests determined by courts to be "compelling" in the context of public ac-
cess cases); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Gotti,
18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1567 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Martin, 684 F. Supp. 341
(D. Mass. 1988); see also Utah v. Archuleta, 21 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241 (Utah 1993);
Gannett Co. v. Falvey, 19 Media. L. Rep. (BNA) 2127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
26. See Doe, 63 F.3d at 128; United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (2d Cir.
1993); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. See Doe, 63 F.3d at 128; Cojab, 996 F.2d at 1408-09; United States ex rel.
Smallwood v. Lavalle, 377 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.
1974); see also Peter B. v. Wisconsin, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1588 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994);
Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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judicial proceedings or to judicial records and documents. By con-
trast, the lower courts have relied upon the Court's criminal-access
cases in extending the First Amendment presumption of public access
to criminal records,28 civil trials,29 and civil records.30 Although little
consistency pervades these opinions, a common thread runs through
the vast majority of these decisions: the acknowledgment that the
First Amendment right of public access is a qualified, not an absolute,
right that should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
B. The Common Law Right of Public Access
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,31 the United States
Supreme Court recognized a common law right of public access "to
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial
records and documents."3 2 The policy reasoning articulated by the
Court in support of its conclusion is similar to that subsequently stated
in the Court's First Amendment right-of-access cases. Indeed, the
Court acknowledged that a "citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on
the workings of public agencies" 33 and "a newspaper publisher's in-
tention to publish information concerning the operation of govern-
28. See In re The State-Record Co., 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1286 (4th Cir. 1990);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Ex parte Consoli-
dated Publ'g Co., 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1105 (Ala. 1992).
29. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Astri Inv. Management &
Sec. Corp. (In re Astri Inv. Management & Sec. Corp.), 88 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988);
see also State v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 542 A.2d 859 (Md. App. 1988). Although
the Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed a First Amendment right of access to civil
trials, there is dicta in a Supreme Court case that suggests that similar access concerns may
arise in both the criminal and civil trial context. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368, 387 n.15 (1979) (noting that "in some civil cases the public interest in access, and the
salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal cases").
30. See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1754 (7th Cir. 1994); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988);
In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Smith v. Smith, 18
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1784 (N.C. Gen. Ct. 1991); Sharon L. Sobczak, To Seal or Not to
Seal?: In Search of Standards, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 406, 408 (1993) (noting that the Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have extended the Supreme Court's reasoning
in the First Amendment right-of-access cases to grant public access outside of the criminal
proceeding context).
31. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
32. Id at 597 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted); see also Sobczak, supra note 30, at 409 ("The
Supreme Court has found that public access has an 'educative' effect by affording the pub-
lic an opportunity to understand the court system, thus producing 'an informed and en-
lightened public opinion."' (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247
(1936))); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that the
common law right of public access to judicial records and documents is "fundamental to a
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ment"3 4 are grounds upon which lower courts have relied to grant
access to public records under the common law doctrine.
Again, the Court found that this common law right of access to
public records and documents is not absolute.35 In defining the
boundaries of the public's common law right of access, the Court
noted: "Every court has supervisory power over its own records and
files, and access has been denied where court files might have become
a vehicle for improper purposes. '36 The examples cited by the Court
to illustrate such "improper purposes" include the use of public
records and documents for the dissemination of libelous statements
and the exposure of privileged business information.37
The items of public record at issue in Nixon were various tapes
that had been admitted into evidence during the trial of the peti-
tioner's former advisors. The Court reversed the decision of the court
of appeals, which had authorized the release of the tapes, and held
that respondents did not have a common law right of access to such
democratic state"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
34. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 (citations omitted).
35. See id. In fact, at least one court has determined that the presumption of public
access does not come into existence if documents are properly filed with the clerk of court
under seal. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 897
(E.D. Pa. 1981). But see Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that the common law presumption of access applies to judicial records
and documents under seal).
In United States v. Amodeo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
applied a "continuum" of relevance in its public access analysis. 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that Part I of a report filed by a court-appointed officer in an action under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was entitled to remain under seal
because the allegations therein were unsworn and releasing the information would more
likely mislead rather than inform the public). Under this continuum of relevance, "the
weight to be given the presumption of access [is] governed by the role of the material at
issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such informa-
tion to those monitoring the federal courts." Id. at 1049. Thus, the court determined that
at the one end of the continuum, the presumption of 'access to evidence introduced at a
trial is especially strong. However, at the other end, the court noted that where "docu-
ments are usually filed with the court and are generally available, the weight of the pre-
sumption is stronger than where filing with the court is unusual or is generally under seal."
Id. at 1050.
36. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35
(1984) ("[W]e have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to [enter protective orders]
under the inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to prevent
abuses, oppression, and injustices."' (quoting International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d
403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1963))).
37. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 ("Similarly, courts have refused to permit their files to
serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption, or as sources of business
information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing.") (citations omitted).
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tapes.3 8 Further, the Court briefly addressed respondent's First
Amendment right-of-access argument. The Court stated that because
the general public did not have physical access to the tapes, the re-
spondent did not have a First Amendment right to copy the tapes.
"The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to informa-
tion about a trial superior to that of the general public. '39
In 1994, the Tenth Circuit in Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado4 °
relied on the Court's discussion in Nixon in stating, "Courts have his-
torically recognized a common law right, though not an absolute right,
of access to governmental records, including judicial records. '41 As
for a constitutional right of access, the court found that, although the
First Amendment ensured public access to judicial proceedings, no
such First Amendment right extended to judicial records and docu-
ments.42 Thus, the public's right to inspect and copy judicial records
38. In analyzing the arguments presented by the parties in support of their respective
positions, the Court noted that it "normally would be faced with the task of weighing the
interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts."
Id. at 602. However, the Court did not apply this balancing test to the facts before it in
Nixon because the Court found that the Presidential Recording Act tipped the scales in
favor of denying release of the tapes. See id. at 605-06 ("Because of this congressionally
prescribed avenue of public access we need not weigh the parties' competing arguments as
though the District Court were the only potential source of information regarding these
historical materials."). The Presidential Recording Act directed the Administrator of Gen-
eral Services to review the tape recordings of former President Richard M. Nixon and
submit to Congress regulations regarding public access to these tapes. See id. at 604 n.16.
39. ld. at 609. Indeed, in cases involving the media's right of access, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that "[t]he proposition 'that the Constitution imposes upon
government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information
not available to members of the public generally.., finds no support in the words of the
Constitution or in any decision of this Court."' Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 850 (1974) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974)). Further, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the First Amendment does not guarantee access to
property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." United States Pos-
tal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (holding that a
statute penalizing persons distributing unstamped mail in a letter box approved by the
United States Postal Service did not infringe upon protected First Amendment rights) (cit-
ing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (no First Amendment right of public access to
military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (no First Amend-
ment right of public access to advertising space on city transit system); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (no First Amendment right of public access to jail or prison)).
40. 21 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994).
41. Id. at 1511-13 (noting that the Court "has never intimated a First Amendment
guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government control")
(citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
42. See id.; see also United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1989) (evaluating
access to presentence reports under the Supreme Court's two-step analysis set forth in
Globe Newspaper and holding that no First Amendment right of access existed as to such
reports); Stone v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988)
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and documents endures under the common law public access
doctrine4 3
In Lanphere & Urbaniak, the Tenth Circuit also analyzed the
question of public access to judicial records under the two-step analy-
sis formulated by the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper44 and sub-
sequent First Amendment criminal-access cases.45 The circuit court
held that access to judicial records in a criminal proceeding, sought to
obtain personal information about the defendant, did not satisfy
either step in the Globe Newspaper analysis. Accordingly, the circuit
court concluded that Globe Newspaper also supported its holding that
no First Amendment right of public access to the records existed. 6
C. The Development of Section 107
The legislative history of section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides little insight into its meaning.47 Some literature suggests that
subsection 107(a) was enacted to recognize explicitly the common law
public access doctrine in the bankruptcy context. 8 As explained by
one notable commentary in the bankruptcy field:
(recognizing that the First Amendment right of public access "has been extended only to
particular judicial records and documents").
43. See Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1511 (explaining the common law public
access doctrine). In its decision, the Tenth Circuit held that the Colorado Legislature had
supplanted the common law right of access to judicial records with an explicit statutory
scheme and, thus, did not apply the common law access doctrine to the facts before it. See
id.
44. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
45. See Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1512.
46. See id. The Tenth Circuit then proceeded to analyze the Colorado statute which
limited public access to judicial records and documents. Although the Tenth Circuit found
that the statute had First Amendment implications, it upheld the statute under the test set
forth by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1513-16.
47. The legislative history does little more than parrot the language of the statute. The
full report on section 107 given by both the Senate and the House of Representatives
states:
Subsection (a) of this section makes all papers filed in a bankruptcy case and the
dockets of the bankruptcy court public and open to examination at reasonable
times without charge. "Docket" includes the claims docket, the proceedings
docket, and all papers filed in a case.
Subsection (b) permits the court, on its own motion, and requires the court, on
the request of a party in interest, to protect trade secrets, confidential research,
development, or commercial information, and to protect persons against scandal-
ous or defamatory matter.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 317-18 (1977); S. REp. No. 95-989, at 30 (1978).
48. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 107.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995);
see also In re Nunn, 49 B.R. 963, 964 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (explaining the correlation
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Section 107(a), derived from former Rule 508 of the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, codifies the public's general right under
common law to inspect and copy public documents, including
judicial records ....
This right of access to public documents is not absolute,
however, and confidentiality may be warranted if access is
sought for an improper purpose. Section 107(b) follows former
Bankruptcy Rule 918 and [provides for appropriate
exceptionsi ....
Given the fact that the enactment of section 107 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Nixon were rendered almost simultaneously, it is
possible to conclude that section 107 was intended to complement and
implement the Nixon decision.
A review of section 107's development illustrates its common law
heritage. Simply stated, subsection 107(a) implements the common
law doctrine of public access to judicial records which arose prior to
the ratification of the Constitution, and which was acknowledged by
the Supreme Court in Nixon. The courts of the United States have
applied the exceptions to open access set forth in subsection 107(b)
for over a century, and the Supreme Court explicitly recognized these
exceptions in Nixon. Thus, a plain reading of section 107 shows no
evidence of a constitutional defect because each subsection of section
107 is consistent with legal principles established early under the com-
mon law and later by the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon.
The exceptions to the public's right of access promulgated in sub-
section 107(b) apply when the desired judicial records and documents
contain, on the one hand, matters which relate to trade secrets, confi-
dential research, development, or commercial information, or, on the
other hand, matters which are scandalous or defamatory.50 Both ex-
ceptions were specifically acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Nixon as instances in which documents have traditionally been ex-
cepted from disclosure under the common law public access doc-
trine.51 Moreover, the special protection granted by the exceptions
set forth in subsection 107(b) can be traced back to the provisions of
between the enactment of subsection 107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme
Court's decision in Nixon).
49. IU 1 107-1 to -2 (footnotes omitted) (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) and In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308
(7th Cir. 1984)).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1),(2) (1993).
51. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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the United States Constitution and the rules of law promulgated
shortly thereafter.
Subsection 107(b)(1) safeguards several specific types of business
information from public disclosure: trade secrets, confidential re-
search, development and commercial information. A trade secret is
most commonly defined to consist of information assembled in one
form or another by a person or business which retains value as a result
of its continued secrecy.5 2 The Constitution provides legal protection
for trade secrets. The United States Constitution states that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 53
Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, laws protecting pat-
ents and copyrights were enacted, and the courts exerted jurisdiction
over trade secret disputes 4.5  Modem legislation55 continues this tradi-
tion as evidenced by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and subsection 107(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
"Confidential" or "commercial" information represents a slightly
more expansive concept than that contemplated by "trade secret." To
establish that a document falls into a subsection 107(b)(1) category,
the party need not demonstrate that the information contained in the
document has independent value as a result of its continued secrecy.
Rather, a party can obtain protection by showing that disclosure
"would cause 'an unfair advantage to competitors by providing them
52. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows:
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Urw. TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. See James R. McKown, Taking Property: Constitutional Ramifications of Litigation
Involving Trade Secrets, 13 REv. LrriG. 253, 257 (1994) (noting that the first patent and
copyright system was implemented in 1790 and that courts have exercised jurisdiction over
trade secret cases for more than 150 years).
55. For a detailed breakdown of state statutes enacted to deter misappropriation of
trade secrets by employees, see id. at 257-58 & nn.16-18. Further, it is important to note
that the underlying rationale for the continued protection of trade secrets is twofold:
"[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of inven-
tion." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
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information as to the commercial operations of the debtor.' 5 6 In
other words, confidential or commercial information need not rise to
the level of a trade secret to warrant protection.57
Like trade secrets, "the authority to protect persons from scan-
dalous or defamatory material has been entrusted to the courts for
well over a century. '5 8 Therefore, subsection 107(b)(2) did not intro-
duce a novel concept into our jurisprudence. Quite the contrary. The
tradition of shielding individuals from the adverse effects of scandal-
ous and defamatory material contained in judicial records and docu-
ments is firmly rooted in our legal heritage. As early as 1842, courts
were granted the power to provide such protection by Rule 26 of the
Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States.59
"Equity Rule 26 directed a judge to order the expungement of any
scandalous or impertinent material contained in a bill filed with the
court.
'60
The authority bestowed upon the courts by Equity Rule 26 has
weathered the test of time, as the Rule was re-enacted as Rule 21 of
the Equity Rules of 191261 and then later implemented as Rule 12(f)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 62 This series of rules pro-
vided the foundation for the protections set forth in subsection
107(b)(2). A comparison of the two, however, evidences several dis-
tinctions. For instance, unlike Equity Rule 26, a bankruptcy judge is
not directed to expunge or strike the offending materials. However,
56. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Ad Hoc Protective Comm. for 10 1/2%
Debenture Holders v. Itel Corp. (In re Itel Corp.), 17 B.R. 942, 944 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982)).
The term "commercial information" was given an even more expansive interpretation in In
re Lomas Financial Corp., No. 90 Civ. 7827, 1991 WL 21231, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1991).
In Lomas, the district court defined "commercial information" to "include information
related 'to the buying and selling of securities on the open market."' Id. (quoting Open
Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 361-63 (1979)). Under this
definition, the district court concluded that information which would allow the creditor's
committee to affect the market trading of the debtor's securities was commercial informa-
tion for purposes of subsection 107(b)(1). See id.
57. See Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 28 (explaining that the standard requiring confiden-
tial commercial information to rise to the level of a trade secret in order to receive protec-
tion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to subsection 107(b)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code).
58. Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.), 191 B.R.
675, 678-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
59. See id. at 678 (citing 210 U.S. app. at 508 n.1, 516-17 (1906) (stating that the United
States Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United
States during the January Term of 1842)).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 678 (citing 226 U.S. app. at 649, 654 (1912)).
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and corresponding advisory committee's note.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the discretion provided a bankruptcy judge in selecting an appropriate
remedy does not alter the underlying basis of subsection 107(b)(2):
"A person within the courts' jurisdiction should not be subjected to
scandalous or defamatory material submitted under the guise of a
properly pleaded court document. '63
Notwithstanding its common law foundation, section 107 may
have constitutional implications under the Supreme Court's First
Amendment right-of-access decisions issued after Nixon.64 The quali-
fied right of access enunciated by the Supreme Court in these cases
clearly supports the presumption in favor of access to judicial records
and documents created by subsection 107(a). Also, the more rigid
boundaries of the First Amendment right of access justify the statu-
tory scheme of section 107, which limits infringement upon public ac-
cess to those exceptions explicitly set forth in subsection 107(b). 65 As
is further discussed in Part IV of this Article,66 the subsection 107(b)
exceptions do not violate the qualified First Amendment right of ac-
cess and can be applied by bankruptcy courts in a manner that facili-
tates the underlying statutory goals.
HI. The Application of Section 107
Bankruptcy courts have invoked a wide array of authority to sup-
port their respective approaches to the application of section 107.
Although the language of subsection 107(b) mirrors that of former
Rule 91867 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the proce-
63. Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 678-79.
64. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of
review applicable to cases under the First Amendment right of public access.
66. See infra notes 114-136 and accompanying text.
67. The language of former Bankruptcy Rule 918 is also set forth in current Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9018, which implements the statutory directive of subsection 107(b). Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9018 provides in pertinent part:
Secret, Confidential, Scandalous or Defamatory Matter
On motion or on its own initiative, with or without notice, the court may make
any order which justice requires (1) to protect the estate or any entity in respect
of a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial in-
formation, (2) to protect any entity against scandalous or defamatory matter con-
tained in any paper filed in a case under the Code, or (3) to protect governmental
matters that are made confidential by statute or regulation. If an order is entered
under this rule without notice, any entity affected thereby may move to vacate or
modify the order, and after a hearing on notice the court shall determine the
motion.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9018. For a discussion of the type of materials within the third category
of information protected by Rule 9018 (which is not explicitly recognized by subsec-
tion 107(b)), see In re Robert Landau Assocs., Inc., 50 B.R. 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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dural structure of section 107 does not have a counterpart in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Thus, bankruptcy courts turned to analogous
nonbankruptcy cases to implement this new congressional mandate.
Unfortunately, the divergent results produced by this practice have
blurred the distinction between the common law right of public access
and the First Amendment right. As a result, little uniformity exists in
the application of section 107.
A. The Fundamentals of Section 107
The presumption of public access created by subsection 107(a)
extends to all papers and documents fied with the bankruptcy court in
a case under Title 11 of the United States Code, including the bank-
ruptcy court's docket.68 The legislative history of subsection 107(a)
indicates that the term "'[d]ocket' includes the claims docket, the pro-
68. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 107-1 ("Section 107(a) provides
that all papers filed in a case under Title 11 and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are
public records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.");
see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (In re Iono-
sphere Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that until the bank-
ruptcy examiner's report is filed with the court, no public right of access attaches to it
under subsection 107(a)).
Because subsection 107(a) applies only to information filed with the bankruptcy court,
it follows that a protective order issued under subsection 107(b) is of a limited nature in
that the protective order does not extend to materials outside of the bankruptcy case.
Thus, if a party legally obtains the information contained in the judicial record through
independent means, a protective order issued under subsection 107(b) presumably does
not reach this information. To hold that protection under subsection 107(b) extends to
materials obtained through proper channels outside of the judicial system would implicate
the prior restraint doctrine. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (holding that a
statute prohibiting a witness from disclosing testimony after a grand jury's term ended
constituted a prior restraint on pure speech in violation of the First Amendment); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (stating that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not con-
stitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest
of the highest order"); Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that where the press obtains information relevant to litigation through independ-
ent means, any restriction on the publication of the information implicates the prior re-
straint doctrine and is only warranted in the most extreme circumstances). Such an
extended application of subsection 107(b) is not supported by the plain language of the
statute or by the case law thereunder. Accordingly, the prior restraint doctrine is not rele-
vant to the application of subsection 107(b). See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20 (1984) (rejecting the prior restraint analysis in the discovery context, as the protec-
tive order at issue only extended to matters generated by the litigation); see also Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,393 n.25 (1979) (explaining that when a protective order
does not involve information already in the possession of the press, the constitutional right
of access, and not the prior restraint doctrine, is the proper inquiry); Miller, supra note 5,
at 436-39 (discussing the distinction between a protective order issued in the discovery
context and a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment).
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ceedings docket, and all papers filed in a case."'69 Therefore, the sub-
section 107(a) presumption of public access appears to have sweeping
coverage over any and all items filed with the bankruptcy court.
Subsection 107(b) provides that upon the request of "a party in
interest, the bankruptcy court shall" protect the requesting party if
either subsection 107(b)(1) or (2) is applicable. Although the phrase
"a party in interest" is used throughout the Bankruptcy Code, the
phrase is not explicitly defined therein.70 However, some guidance as
to the scope of the phrase is, provided in section 1109 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Subsection 1109(b) provides in pertinent part: "A party
in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee,
an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security
holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be
heard on any issue in a case under this chapter."'7 1 It is a reasonable
deduction from this provision that the phrase "a party in interest" ex-
tends to those parties specifically referenced in section 1109. The fact
that section 107 is applicable to cases filed under any chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code and not just Chapter 1172 should not impair the util-
ity of this analogy for establishing the base group included within the
phrase.7
Having determined that those encompassed within the phrase "a
party in interest" may include the debtor, the trustee, a creditors'
committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an eq-
69. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 317-18 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 30 (1978); see also
supra note 46.
70. See In re Overmyer, 24 B.R. 437, 440 & n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that
the phrase "a party in interest" is used in 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(b), 303(g), 304(b), 326(a),
330(a), 362(d), 366(b), 502(a), 506(d), 706(b), and 727(c)(2), yet is not defined in any provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1993).
72. See Overmyer, 24 B.R. at 440 n.4 ("[Title] 11 U.S.C. § 103(f) provides that sub-
chapters I, II, 11 of Chapter 11 apply only in a case under Chapter 11. Code § 1109(b)
appears in subehapter I of Chapter 11.").
73. See id. at 440 (explaining that, under the Rules of Construction set forth in 11
U.S.C. § 102(3), "includes" and "including" are not words of limitation).
In interpreting the phrase "a party in interest," some courts have narrowly construed
the category of creditors falling within the scope of the phrase to those creditors who hold
an allowed claim in the bankruptcy case. See In re Stewart, 46 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D. Or.
1985) (holding that a creditor who had not filed a proof of claim in the debtor's bankruptcy
case was not a party in interest entitled to object to the debtor's discharge). But see In re
Hardy, 56 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (holding that Chapter 13 confirmation plan
by debtor when no creditors filed proof of claim was required by statute). Further, the
phrase "a party in interest" has been held not to include a debtor who owes money to the
estate and a noncreditor seeking information for use in litigation against a debtor-related
entity. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 107-4 and cases cited therein.
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uity security holder, and any indenture trustee, it is necessary to ana-
lyze the obligation of the bankruptcy court upon receiving a request
for protection from any such party. The language of subsection 107(b)
as it relates to a request from a party in interest is mandatory. Ac-
cordingly, "if the information fits any of the specified categories [11
U.S.C. subsections 107(b)(1) or (2)], the court is required to protect a
requesting interested party and has no discretion to deny the
application." 74
Although subsection 107(b) directs the trial court to protect a
party in interest, it grants the court considerable discretion in per-
forming this task. This dual structure distinguishes subsection 107(b)
from statutes placing an unconstitutional ban on the public's First
Amendment right of access. Such statutes strip judges of all discretion
in a particular type of proceeding. For example, a statute requiring
courts to close all trials relating to sexual offenses committed against
minors was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional.75
In contrast, subsection 107(b) requires the bankruptcy judge to pro-
tect the requesting party only if one of the traditional exceptions to
public access is determined to be applicable.76 The bankruptcy judge
retains complete discretion in reviewing the record to determine if an
exception is applicable and in fashioning an appropriate remedy.77
74. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24,27 (2d Cir. 1994); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 1
107-4 (stating that "[p]rotection [under 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)] is mandatory when requested
by a 'party in interest"').
75. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609-11 (1982).
76. See discussion supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
77. See Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.), 191
B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) ("The discretion lies not in whether a court may
protect an interested party, but in whether the matters complained of fall within the excep-
tion and in what type of protective remedy is necessary under the facts of each case.").
Moreover, because subsection 107(b) sets forth two specific exceptions to the general com-
mon law rule in favor of public access to judicial records and documents, the court must
structure the remedy it provides under subsection 107(b) to protect only that information
which is a trade secret, confidential research, development or commercial information, or
scandalous or defamatory. See, e.g., U at 680 (explaining that the actions of the party
objecting to the sealing of the complaint had stripped the court of the least intrusive
method of protection which would have been releasing the complaint in a redacted form).
General protective orders which seal the entire record of any given proceeding are not
warranted unless every document in the record satisfies one of the categories protected in
subsection 107(b). See, ag., United States v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental
Airlines, Inc.), 150 B.R. 334, 339 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (examining each portion of exam-
iner's report to determine which statements, if any, satisfied subsection 107(b)); In re Lo-
mas Fin. Corp., No. 90 Civ. 7827, 1991 WL 21231, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1991) (finding
that sealing entire document when only four sentences warranted protection under subsec-
tion 107(b) was an overbroad remedy).
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Under subsection 107(b), the burden of proof in establishing the
applicability of the exceptions rests with the requesting interested
party.78 To satisfy this burden, the requesting party need only show
that the information sought to be protected is either confidential com-
mercial information or is scandalous or defamatory. The party is not
required by the statute to demonstrate "good cause," as is required,
for example, by Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.79
78. Although there are no reported decisions explicitly addressing the burden of proof
under subsection 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, nonbankruptcy cases dealing with similar
exceptions to the presumption of public access hold that the burden lies with the party
seeking the application of the exception. See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551-52
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that "[a] party to seal ... a judicial record bears the heavy burden
of showing that 'the material is the kind of information that courts will protect."' (quoting
in part Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984))); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding the
presumption of public access must be balanced against legitimate privacy concerns of the
party). Placing the burden on the requesting interested party under subsection 107(b) ap-
pears to be warranted in light of the strong presumption in favor of public access. In
meeting this burden, the requesting party should be able to generically bring to the court's
attention the facts which classify the information as a protected category under subsec-
tion 107(b) without disclosing the specific items sought to be protected. For an example of
an argument which suffices under this standard of proof, see Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 677-79
(finding that when a reasonable person would alter their opinion of defendant based on
allegations in complaint, court is within its power to protect defendant by limited public
access).
79. When Congress addressed the secrecy problem in subsection 107(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code it imposed no requirement to show "good cause" as a condition
to sealing confidential commercial information. This omission is particularly sig-
nificant because Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which
the language of subsection 107(b) appears to have been drawn, expressly required
"good cause" to be established before a discovery protective order could be
granted-even when the material sought to be protected was "a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information."
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d
24,28 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the congressional mandate of subsection 107(b) elimi-
nates the need to inquire whether cause exists for the requested protection); see also Phar-
Mor, 191 B.R. at 679 (finding that "[t]he mandatory language of § 107(b) negates the need
for such inquiries [into good cause or compelling reasons]") (citing Orion, 21 F.3d at 28).
But see In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2498 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1995) (suggesting that the "good cause" requirement used in the context of pro-
tective orders under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should likewise be
used in the bankruptcy court's analysis under § 107 of the Bankruptcy Code).
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in a bankruptcy case
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7026. However, Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules (which
encompasses Rule 7026) only governs adversary proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 7001
and contested matters, unless the court directs otherwise, under Bankruptcy Rule 9014.
Thus, a request for a protective order in the discovery context during the course of an
adversary proceeding or a contested matter requires a showing of "good cause" to justify
the order under Bankruptcy Rule 7026(c). The term "good cause" under Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been interpreted to require a "show[ing] that disclo-
sure will work a clearly defined and serious injury." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
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"Because Congress enacted an express statutory scheme, issues
concerning public disclosure of documents in bankruptcy cases should
be resolved under section 107. '' s° Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
need not balance the equities of the case, as Congress has already per-
formed that task. The bankruptcy court need look only to the explicit
language of section 107. The outcome of Congress's evaluation of
public access in the bankruptcy context is that, if information is a
trade secret, confidential research, development or commercial infor-
mation, or scandalous or defamatory, the information and the request-
ing party are entitled to protection.81 Thus, the bankruptcy court's
decision focuses on whether the information satisfies the criteria set
forth in subsection 107(b).82 The special protection granted to the two
categories of information delineated in subsection 107(b) is justified in
the bankruptcy context, as the participation of all interested parties is
encouraged and full disclosure by the debtor is required.
Even if a party in interest fails to request protection under sub-
section 107(b), the court on its own initiative may provide protection
to the appropriate entity or person. In considering whether to take
action sua sponte under section 107, the bankruptcy court must bal-
ance the commercial interests or tort rights to be protected "against
the fundamental interest in having open public and party access to
Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citing Essex Wire Co. v. Eastern
Elec. Sales Co. 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969)). Otherwise, a request for a protective order
in a bankruptcy case is governed by section 107 and the requesting party need only demon-
strate one of the subsection 107(b) exceptions to justify its request for protection.
80. Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 679 (citing Continental Airlines, 150 B.R. at 334).
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. In reaching its decision, the bankruptcy court should set forth specific findings of
fact to support its conclusion. Otherwise, upon appeal, the record may be deemed insuffi-
cient to support the bankruptcy court's discretionary decision. For the proposition that the
trial court must make "findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine
whether the closure order was properly entered," see In re Foundation for New Era Philan-
thropy, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Publicker Indus., Inc.
v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348,
1361-62 (3d Cir. 1994) (nonbankruptey case in which the Third Circuit reiterated the need
for a trial court to make specific findings on the record with respect to closure decisions).
The need for a trial court to create a record to support its decision arises because the
standard of review upon appeal is for abuse of discretion, as is demonstrated by the recent
Sixth Circuit decision in Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir.
1996) (addressing the issue of prior restraint under the First Amendment in the nonban-
kruptcy context). See also Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)
(nonbankruptcy case) ("We review the district court's denial of access to its records for
abuse of discretion."); Continental Airlines, 150 B.R. at 338-39) (reviewing a bankruptcy
court's decision to seal a document under subsection 107(b) and stating that "[a] bank-
ruptcy court decision constitutes an abuse of discretion if the court failed to apply the
proper legal standards or based its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact").
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papers filed in judicial proceedings."83 "[T]he Bankruptcy Court is
entitled to substantial deference and latitude with respect to [such]
discretionary case management decisions."'
The final issue that may arise in the basic application of section
107 of the Bankruptcy Code is the ability of third parties to intervene
in proceedings. The majority view is that permissive intervention
should be freely granted to third parties who represent the public's
interest in a particular bankruptcy proceeding.85 Third-party interven-
tion is encouraged in public access proceedings because "otherwise
the decision of the Court could be shielded from effective review and,
thus, without a right to intervene, the public would have no way to
protect its broad right of access granted by section 107(a) and the
common law."86
B. The Subsection 107(b)(1) Exception
Subsection 107(b)(1) provides "protect[ion to] an entity with re-
spect to a trade secret or confidential research, development, or com-
mercial information. 's7 Subsection 101(15) of the Bankruptcy Code
defines an "entity" to "include[ ] [a] person, estate, trust, governmen-
tal unit, and [the] United States trustee. '88
A common type of document sought to be protected pursuant to
the 107(b)(1) exception is the list of creditors that must be filed by the
debtor in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a). 89 The majority
of bankruptcy courts that have addressed the issue of sealing a list of
83. ContinentalAirlines, 150 B.R. at 338; see also In re General Homes Corp., 181 B.R.
898, 903 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that a bankruptcy court must balance the com-
peting interests of secrecy and the presumption in favor of access when exercising its dis-
cretionary powers under subsection 107(b)).
84. Continental Airlines, 150 B.R. at 338.
85. See Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 675-76; In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 93 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1989); In re EPIC Assocs. V, 54 B.R. 445, 447-48 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); see also
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (nonbankruptcy public
access case) (holding that "the procedural device of permissive intervention is appropri-
ately used to enable a litigant who was not an original party to an action to challenge
protective or confidentiality orders entered in that action").
86. EPIC Assocs., 54 B.R. at 448.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) (1993) (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 101(15); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 1 107-5.
89. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(a), (j). To support an argument in favor of protecting
a list of creditors, the requesting party often relies on subsection 0) of Bankruptcy Rule
1007. Subsection 0) provides in pertinent part:
IMPOUNDING OF LISTS. On motion of a party in interest and for cause
shown the court may direct the impounding of the lists filed under this rule, and
may refuse to permit inspection by any entity. The court may permit inspection
or use of lists, however, by any party in interest on terms prescribed by the court.
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creditors have refused to provide protection under subsection
107(b)(1). 0 Bankruptcy courts unanimously agree that general con-
cerns, such as a fear of embarrassment due to being listed in the bank-
ruptcy case, are insufficient to classify a list of creditors as confidential
commercial information. 9' However, in In re EPIC Associates V,92
the parties requesting protection asserted that a run on area banks
listed as large creditors was certain to result from disclosure. The
bankruptcy court found this assertion persuasive and, based on the
specific offer, a protective order sealed the identity of the banks.93
Bankruptcy courts tend to treat requests to shield other papers pro-
duced as a result of the bankruptcy case, such as a motion to
convert,94 settlement agreements,95  and fee examiner reports,96
Id. The interplay between subsection 107(b)(1) and Bankruptcy Rule 10070) often causes
a bankruptcy court to scrutinize more intensely lists and schedules filed pursuant to Bank-
ruptcy Rule 1007(a) because of Rule 1007(j)'s cause requirement. However, most courts
separately analyze the protection granted lists and schedules under the respective provi-
sions and hold that such information fails to qualify as a trade secret or confidential or
commercial information for purposes of subsection 107(b)(1).
90. See, ag., In re Foundation for a New Era Philanthropy, 23 Media L. Rep. 2498
(BNA) (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that desire to protect charitable organization do-
nor from public exposure did not outweigh right to public access in refusing to seal the
debtor's list of creditors); In re Moramerica Fin. Corp., 158 B.R. 135 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1993) (finding that privacy interests of the debtor's investors did not warrant sealing the list
of creditors); Ad Hoe Protective Comm. for 10 1/2% Debenture Holders v. Itel Corp. (In
re Itel Corp.), 17 B.R. 942 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the debtor's list of creditors
did not rise to the level of commercial information to qualify for protection under subsec-
tion 107(b)(1)).
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. 54 B.R. 445 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
93. Idt at 449-50.
94. See In re Reliable Investors Corp., 44 B.R. 904 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (denying
the debtor's request to seal a secured creditor and indenture trustee's motion to convert or
appoint a trustee because such general concerns as the substance of the motion adversely
affecting a vote on confirmation did not categorize the motion as confidential or commer-
cial information). Likewise, allegations set forth in a creditor's application to extend the
time provided for objecting to the debtor's discharge were found to be ineligible for sub-
section 107(b) protection. See In re Overmyer, 24 B.R. 437,441-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(finding that the allegations were relevant to and in support of the issues raised by the
application and therefore were part of the public record). But see In re Lomas Fin. Corp.,
No. 90 Civ. 7827, 1991 WL 21231, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1991) (holding that certain
information contained in the response by the official creditor's committee to the debtor's
application for extension of the exclusivity period constituted "commercial information"
and, thus, sealing the offending portions of the response).
95. See In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 83 B.R. 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding that a
settlement agreement between the debtor and a creditor did not contain information rising
to the level of a trade secret or confidential or commercial information and thus did not
warrant protection).
96. See United States v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines), 150
B.R. 334 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (reversing the bankruptcy court's decision which sealed all
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in a similar manner, rarely finding that they qualify for protec-
tion.97
In cases concerning a debtor's business operations, bankruptcy
courts are more receptive to arguments presented under subsection
107(b)(1). Documents relating to business transactions of the debtor
have been protected as confidential commercial information. 9s For
example, in Orion Pictures, documents connected with a promotional
agreement between the debtor and a third party qualified for protec-
tion.99 The willingness of bankruptcy courts to more readily withhold
business-related materials from public disclosure can be traced to two
complementary policies: (1) business information which rises to the
level of a trade secret or confidential or commercial information has
traditionally received the protection of American courts;100 and (2)
there is a need to protect the viability of a debtor-in-possession from
competitors who might otherwise obtain an unfair advantage via the
disclosure of information related to the debtor's business
operations.' 0'
C. The Subsection 107(b)(2) Exception
Under subsection 107(b)(2), the bankruptcy court may "protect a
person with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter contained in a
fee examiner reports and responses thereto); see also In re Revco, 18 Media L. Rep. 1591
(BNA) (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (directing the final report of the examiner to be un-
sealed); In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989) (finding that party could
object to the sealing of the examiner's reports but had no right to immediate review of
documents underlying the report).
97. See also In re General Homes Corp., 181 B.R. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding
that the stipulation between the debtor and the creditor's committee which sought to have
the bankruptcy court vacate prior order sanctioning the creditor's committee was not war-
ranted under subsection 107(b)); In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(finding that requesting party was not entitled to have transcripts of depositions sealed
until such time as the transcripts were admitted into evidence at the debtor's confirmation
hearing).
98. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pic-
tures Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994) (protecting documents relating to promotional
agreement from disclosure as confidential and commercial information under subsection
107(b)(1)); In re Nunn, 49 B.R. 963 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (finding that the debtor's cus-
tomer list constituted commercial information and qualified for protection under subsec-
tion 107(b)(1)). But see In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 661 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(holding that the customers of the debtor did not hold a sufficient privacy interest in their
financial affairs to warrant sealing the debtor's customer list under section 107).
99. Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 27-28.
100. See discussion supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
101. See Ad Hoe Protective Comm. for 10 1/2% Debenture Holders v. Itel Corp. (In re
Itel Corp.), 17 B.R. 942, 944-45 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (finding that names and addresses of
creditors did not constitute protected commercial information).
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paper filed in a case under this title."' 02 The definition of "person" in
subsection 101(41) includes "individual[s], partnership[s], and corpo-
ration[s].' 10 3  Although the class of persons covered by subsec-
tion 107(b)(2) is well defined, the type of materials constituting
scandalous or defamatory matter is not.
When determining whether materials filed are scandalous or de-
famatory, bankruptcy courts consider both the trith of the matter as-
serted'0 4 and "whether a reasonable person could alter their opinion
of [the party] based on the statements therein, taking those statements
in the context in which they appear."'' 0 Thus, documents asserting
truthful, yet prejudicial, allegations 0 6 or documents causing mere em-
barrassment to the party0 7 are not scandalous or defamatory materi-
als under subsection 107(b)(2). Vague and voluminous allegations
stated in pleadings filed with the court are likewise ineligible for pro-
tection under this analysis.' 08 As one bankruptcy court noted: "No
reasonable person would be caused to alter any opinion of [the
party]" based on such allegations. 10 9
Scandalous or defamatory material is composed of false allega-
tions that cause an injury to the party. This injury may relate to the
party's reputation in the business community" 0 or to aspects of the
102. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2) (1993).
103. Id. § 101(41); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY, supra note 48, '1 107-5.
104. In re Whitener, 57 B.R. 707, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (finding that "[t]he dis-
semination of truthful matter cannot be enjoined merely because the matter is prejudicial;
subsection 107(b)(2) requires that the matter be scandalous or defamatory").
105. Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor), 191 B.R. 675,
679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (citing In re Commodore Corp., 70 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1987) and In re Sherman-Noyes & Prairie Apartments Real Estate Inv. Partner-
ship, 59 B.R. 905, 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)).
106. See In re Whitener, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 395, 398-99 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1986) (holding that the debtor was not entitled to have bankruptcy discharge expunged
from the record because mere prejudice does not convert truthful allegations to scandalous
or defamatory matter).
107. See In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 83 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987) (finding
that record was insufficient to show material contained in settlement agreement was scan-
dalous or defamatory, as the record only supported a possible finding of embarrassment).
108. See Commodore, 70 B.R. at 546 (finding that the allegations in various pleadings
which the requesting party sought to have court strike from the record were not likely to
alter any person's opinion of the party as the allegations were vague and voluminous in
nature); Sherman-Noyes & Prairie, 59 B.R. at 908-09 (finding that voluminous allegations
by debtor would tax credulity when examining files).
109. Sherman-Noyes & Prairie, 59 B.R. at 909; see also Commodore, 70 B.R. at 546
(adopting the reasoning set forth by the court in Sherman-Noyes & Prairie).
110. See Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 679-80 (holding false allegations in complaint amounted
to scandalous or defamatory material because the allegations were misleading and would
cause a reasonable person to alter their opinion of the defendants). But see Hope ex rel
Clark v. Pearson, 38 B.R. 423 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) (holding fear that release of allega-
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party's personal affairs which fall within the rubric of the constitu-
tional right of privacy.11' Actual pecuniary loss is not necessary to
establish an injury under subsection 107(b)(2). 12
IV. Following the Congressional Mandate of Section 107
Within Constitutional Bounds
"It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that 'where
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, [reviewing courts should] construe the statute
to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.' 11 3 By interpreting section 107 in light of the
foregoing rule of construction, bankruptcy courts can protect the types
of information set forth in subsection 107(b) without offending the
First Amendment or common law rights of access embodied by sub-
section 107(a).
A. A Constitutional Application of Section 107
A proper interpretation of subsection 107(a) begins by recogniz-
ing its common law heritage. As noted, section 107 essentially codifies
the broad common law public access doctrine" 4 to allow disclosure of
filed papers. Subsection 107(b) codifies two exceptions to disclosure
discussed by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc."- While acknowledging that the First Amendment right of access
to judicial records is based upon the common law doctrine," 6 the
Supreme Court has allowed only a qualified First Amendment right of
tions in a pleading would adversely affect business activities is not sufficient under subsec-
tion 107(b)(2)).
111. See In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 661, 662-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). The
bankruptcy court in Bell & Beckwith held that the financial affairs and privacy interests of
creditor's customers did not constitute scandalous or defamatory material under subsection
107(b)(2). However, the court noted that, if the privacy interests asserted by a party con-
stitute a constitutionally protected privacy right, protection under subsection 107(b)(2)
may be considered. Id. at 664. The court cited "marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, child bearing, and education" as examples of such constitutionally pro-
tected privacy rights. Id. at 662 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
112. See Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 679 (holding allegations in complaint were scandalous
or defamatory without a showing that the defendants would suffer a pecuniary loss if alle-
gations were unsealed).
113. United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
114. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
115. 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
116. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
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public access to such records in the context of criminal trials." 7 The
Supreme Court has not endorsed a general First Amendment right of
public access to court documents." 8
The appellate courts that have protected public access to judicial
records and documents under the First Amendment have supported
their decisions by drawing analogies to the Supreme Court deci-
sions.1 9 The propriety of such analogies is questionable because the
"Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of
access to all sources of information within government control.'
2 0
Nevertheless, the First Amendment is not violated by the subsec-
tion 107(b) exceptions under the Supreme Court's two-step analysis
set forth in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.'
21
The first step in the Supreme Court's analysis evaluates whether a
particular proceeding or record has historically been available to the
public. Courts have traditionally not allowed access to information
protected by the subsection 107(b) exceptions.' 22 Information con-
taining a trade secret, confidential research, development or commer-
cial information, or alleging scandalous or defamatory matter has not
"historically... been open to the press ... [or] general public."'2 3
The sensitive and private nature of the information protected by sub-
117. See discussion supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
118. See Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1511-13 (10th Cir.) (finding
that "there is... no First Amendment right... of access to government records"), cert
denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994); see also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
119. See discussion supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
120. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality opinion) (denying access
to a prison where inmate committed suicide); see also discussion supra note 35 and accom-
panying text.
121. 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982). In adopting the two-step analysis relying on historical
openness and the significance of access to the particular proceeding, the Court reasoned:
"Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in the various opinions in Rich-
mond Newspapers, together serve to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in par-
ticular is properly afforded protection by the First Amendment." Id. at 605 (citing
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
Under the Supreme Court's public access analysis, several lower courts have deter-
mined that access to judicial records and documents is not guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. See Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1512-16 (declining to extend the Supreme
Court's public access analysis to criminal records sought for commercial purposes); United
States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that no public right of access to
presentence reports exists under the Supreme Court's two-step analysis); In re Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (distinguishing pretrial
access to judicial records and documents from access to the trial itself); see also Sobczak,
supra note 30, at 407-10 (discussing the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
decision in light of Supreme Court precedent).
122. See discussion supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
123. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605; see also discussion supra notes 46-56 and ac-
companying text.
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section 107(b) justifies its special treatment. 124 The Supreme Court's
own historical adherence to this protection further justifies a finding
that these two categories of information fail to satisfy the first step in
the Court's two-prong public access analysis."2
The second step in the analysis considers whether "access to...
[the information] plays a particularly significant role in the functioning
of the judicial process and the government as a whole. ' 126 Subsection
107(b) does not restrict access to every document in the bankruptcy
case. 127 Rather, the protection afforded by subsection 107(b) is specif-
ically tailored to two narrow types of information, both highly private
in nature. It is difficult to perceive how information regarding confi-
dential business affairs or false and injurious allegations could en-
hance public scrutiny "of the judicial process and the government as a
whole."128
Most often, the information protected by subsection 107(b) is one
document, or a portion of a document, among a multitude of filings.129
To suggest that one document could be "particularly significant" to
the judicial process or the government as a whole is spurious, and in-
deed ignores the private rather than public nature inherent in a docu-
ment covered by subsection 107(b).'3 0 Thus, a conclusion that the
information protected by subsection 107(b) is essential to public eval-
124. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (court can insure
that its records are not used to promote public scandal through publication of disgusting
details of divorce); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion
Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "[iun limited circumstances,
courts must deny access to judicial documents-generally where open inspection may be
used as a vehicle for improper purposes"); Schmedding v. May, 48 N.W. 201 (Mich. 1891)
(court refused to permit its records to be used as sources of business information that
might harm litigant's competitive standing).
125. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 (explaining the traditional exceptions to public
access recognized by courts).
126. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
127. See discussion supra notes 67-68,77 and accompanying text (explaining the restric-
tive nature of section 107's application and the necessity for a party to show that each
document sought to be protected satisfies one of the subsection 107(b) exceptions).
128. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. For an excellent discussion of the privacy con-
cerns implicated by a presumption of private access, see Miller, supra note 5, at 463-77.
129. For example, the complaint which Phar-Mor ultimately withdrew was only one
document of more than 9,000 documents filed in the main case, as well as the thousands of
documents filed in the 36-plus adversary proceedings.
130. See discussion supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
supporting the traditional protection of confidential business information and scandalous
and defamatory materials).
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uation of the government expands the public access analysis well be-
yond the current bounds of Supreme Court precedent. 131
Moreover, section 107 places the relevant decisions regarding the
exceptions and remedies to be provided under subsection 107(b) com-
pletely within the discretion of the bankruptcy court through, among
other things, protective orders.' 32 Indeed, "[a] well-drafted protective
order that limits access to and the use and dissemination of the infor-
mation is the most effective means of preserving an individual's pri-
vacy or the commercial value of the data while making it available for
legitimate litigation purposes."'1 33 The discretion granted the bank-
ruptcy court under subsection 107(b) includes a myriad of options in
fashioning an appropriate remedy. For example, if only a portion of
the document contains offending language, the court can strike or ex-
punge that language from the document, or place a limited seal on
those few sentences. 134  For example, if the identity of the parties
named in a particular document is all that is sought to be protected,
the court can release the document in a redacted form. 135 Further, if
upon review the filing appears to be imprudent or irrelevant, the court
can give the requesting party an opportunity to withdraw the docu-
ment.136 Regardless of the option selected, it is clear that the discre-
131. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512-16 (10th Cir.) (de-
clining to extend the Supreme Court's public access analysis to criminal records sought for
commercial purposes), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994).
132. See discussion supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (explaining the discretion
provided by section 107 and distinguishing the section from those statutes determined to
be an unconstitutional ban on public access).
133. Miller, supra note 5, at 476 (arguing against stripping a trial court of all protection
in the discovery context under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
134. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994) (sealing each document relating to promotional agree-
ment as confidential or commercial information under subsection 107(b)(1)); In re Lomas
Fin. Corp., No. 90 Civ. 7827, 1991 WL 21231 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1991) (sealing only the four
sentences in document which satisfied subsection 107(b)); see also Pepsico, Inc. v. Red-
mond, 46 F.3d 29 (7th Cir. 1995) (nonbankruptcy case) (endorsing partial seal on docu-
ments containing trade secrets).
135. See Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.), 191
B.R. 675, 680 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding that the release of a document in a re-
dacted form is an appropriate means to protect the identity of parties under subsection
107(b); however, the factual circumstances before the court precluded the use of this rem-
edy) (citing Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1982)); In re EPIC Assocs. V, 54 B.R.
445 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (sealing only names of creditor financial institutions under
subsection 107(b) to protect against a run on the bank); see also United States v. Amodeo,
44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (nonbankruptcy case) (recognizing authority of district court to
edit and redact offending materials in documents filed with the court before public access is
granted to those documents).
136. See Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 680; see also Church of Scientology Int'l v. Fishman, 35
F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision), No. 94-55443, 1994 WL 467999 (9th
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tion granted by section 107 fosters the creation of a remedy
specifically tailored to protect the privacy and business interests of a
party without unduly burdening the public's right of access to judicial
records.
B. A Case Study of Section 107: Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants
Named Under Seal
1. The Facts
Phar-Mor, Inc. is a multistate deep-discount drug store which suc-
cessfully reorganized through a Chapter 11 proceeding. The Chapter
11 examiner's report disclosed numerous pre-petition insider transac-
tions.137 Phar-Mor's former president, Michael Monus, was the owner
of or a partner or investor in several entities associated with Phar-
Mor.138 One of these entities was a limited partnership that owned
the real estate Phar-Mor leased for its corporate headquarters and
other business operations. 39 Mr. Monus was the limited partnership's
general partner and was responsible for its day-to-day operations pur-
suant to the limited partnership agreement. n Citing his participation
in insider transactions with several entities, including the limited part-
nership, Phar-Mor's board of directors terminated Mr. Monus imme-
diately prior to filing its Chapter 11 petition.141
Phar-Mor, the debtor-in-possession, instituted negotiations dur-
ing the administration of the Chapter 11 case to recoup all or some of
the lease payments it made to the limited partnership. It also at-
tempted to renegotiate the terms of the leases. Faced with a statute of
limitations on claims of preferences and fraudulent transfers, and
while settlement negotiations were ongoing, Phar-Mor brought an ad-
versary action against the partnership and its limited partners. 42 The
complaint alleged that the partnership or its limited partners had en-
Cir. Aug. 30, 1994) (nonbankruptey case) (recognizing authority of district court to seal or
return documents containing offending or privileged information).
137. See Examiner's Report, In re Phar-Mor, Inc., Ch. 11 Case Nos. 92-41599 through
92-41614 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (No. 4243) [hereinafter Chapter 11 Examiner's Report].
138. See Jay Alix, Phar-Mor Examiner, Summary Discussion and Overview of Exam-
iner's Final Report (Jan. 19, 1994) (on file with Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
139. See Chapter 11 Examiner's Report, supra note 137, at 13-1 ff.
140. See Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 677-78.
141. See Chapter 11 Examiner's Report, supra note 137, at 13-9.
142. See Complaint, Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor,
Inc.), Ch. 11 Case No. 92-41599, Adv. No. 94-4074 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (As part of the
court's remedy in Phar-Mor, the court granted plaintiff leave to withdraw the complaint in
lieu of permanently sealing it. See Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. at 680.) [hereinafter Complaint].
Mr. Monus was a debtor in his own personal Chapter 11 case, and automatic stay did not
permit him to be joined as a party. See idt at 677.
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gaged in various preference or fraudulent transfer actions and
breaches of fiduciary duty. 4 3 Phar-Mor had knowledge, however,
that the day-to-day operations of the partnership had been exclusively
controlled by Mr. Monus and that the limited partners had no control
over such operations.
Along with the adversary complaint, debtor-in-possession Phar-
Mor filed a motion to have the complaint held under seal pending the
completion of settlement negotiations. 144 The motion set forth the cir-
cumstances surrounding the filing of the complaint and stated the
debtor-in-possession's belief that publicity surrounding the allegations
of the complaint would likely cause settlement negotiations to break
down.14 5 The court entered an order holding the complaint under seal
and extending for a like period the time in which defendants could
answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. 46
Phar-Mor's action against the limited partnership was ultimately
settled. 47 Upon settlement, the limited partners asked the court to
permanently seal the record."4 A newspaper of general circulation in
the area sought and was granted intervention to oppose, in the public
interest, the permanent sealing of the record.' 4 The intervenor
presented a three-fold argument in support of its position. 50 First, the
intervenor argued that common law, the First Amendment, and vari-
ous statutes, including 11 U.S.C. § 107(a), gave the newspaper a right
of access to the papers filed in the adversary action. 5' Second, the
intervenor argued that 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2) was an unconstitutional
infringement of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. 5 2 Fi-
nally, the intervenor argued that if the defendant limited partners
were entitled to protection, the protection must take the form least
restrictive of access to the court papersY.5 3
143. See Complaint, supra note 142.
144. See Motion to Permanently Seal Adversary Proceedings, Phar-Mor, Inc. v. De-
fendants Named Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.), Ch. 11 Case No. 92-41599, Adv. No.
94-4074 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
145. See id
146. See Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Defendants Under Seal (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.), Ch. 11 Case
No. 92-41599, Adv. No. 94-4074 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (order sealing complaint).
147. See Phar-Mor, 119 B.R. at 678.
148. See id at 677.
149. See id
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2. The Decision
The court first traced the language of 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2) from
the original form in the first equity rules. 54 Noting that the authority
described in subsection 107(b)(2) (and its predecessors) has stood
without constitutional challenge since 1842, the court was comfortable
in dismissing intervenor's First Amendment challenge. 55 Next, the
court considered the intervenor's argument that there was a common
law right of access to judicial records. 56 Recognizing that the right
was not absolute, 57 the court reviewed the court-constructed limits on
the right of access, as well as the congressionally enacted statutory
limits on the privilege of inspection of judicial records. 58
According to the court, section 107 gives access to court papers
with specific exceptions for confidential commercial information and
scandalous or defamatory material, codifying the Supreme Court's
Nixon decision as to bankruptcy proceedings. 59 The court held that
this express statutory scheme mandates that issues of public access to
bankruptcy court papers be decided by application of 11 U.S.C.
§ 107.160
In the bankruptcy setting, the court acknowledged the threshold
requirement that persons seeking subsection 107(b) protection show
that they are an interested party.' 6' The court held that the interested
party then bears the burden of showing how the matters complained
of are scandalous or defamatory. 62 The test applied by the court in
Phar-Mor considers "whether a reasonable person could alter their
opinion of a party based on the statements in the context in which
they appear."' 63
Under this test, the court held that the statements in the sealed
complaint constituted scandalous or defamatory matters. 164 The court
noted that the complaint was filed for various strategic reasons that
would not likely be appreciated by a reasonable lay person. 65 Recog-
nizing that the defendant limited partners were persons with positive
154. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
155. See Phar-Mor, 119 B.R. at 679.
156. See id








165. See id. at 679-80.
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reputations in the business and professional communities, the court
concluded that the allegations in the sealed complaint would cause the
public to alter its opinion of the defendants.166 It was actually Mr.
Monus, the former president and general partner of the defendant
partnership, who was believed to have breached a fiduciary duty. Yet,
because of the stay in his individual Chapter 11 case (and Phar-Mor's
reluctance to seek relief from the stay necessarily implicating issues of
the pending criminal prosecution), the complaint could not identify
the actual perpetrator.167
Finally, the court, holding that defendants were entitled to pro-
tection, turned to considerations regarding the appropriate degree of
protection. 168 The court recognized that a previous court-approved
method of using redacted papers had been foreclosed by intervenor's
own action.169 As the adversary action had been settled without de-
fendants ever having responded to the complaint, the court concluded
that, based upon the facts before it, granting leave to the plaintiff to
withdraw the complaint was the appropriate remedy.170 The with-
drawal of the offending complaint was the least intrusive method of
protecting the defendants and serving the underlying goals of
11 U.S.C. § 107.' 1
V. Conclusion
Bankruptcy Code subsection 107(b), although a restriction on
public access to court papers, does not offend First Amendment prin-
ciples. It is consistent with established constitutional and common law
protections of proprietary information. It also recognizes the inherent
authority of a court to control its own docket, as well as the conduct of
those appearing before it.
Public access to bankruptcy court papers should not come at the
expense of a person's ability to seek the protection of the bankruptcy
laws. Denying a party in interest the type of protection set forth in
subsection 107(b) would tend to discourage persons from using the
bankruptcy courts and, consequently, thwart the rehabilitative objec-
tives of the Bankruptcy Code. Such a disincentive is not mandated by
the First Amendment or common law public access doctrine and
166. See id. at 680.
167. See id. at 677-78, 680.
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should not be created by a court's reluctance to apply subsection
107(b). Section 107 strikes an appropriate balance between two prin-
ciples that have historically received judicial protection; i.e., the pub-
lic's right of access and the privacy interests of litigants. Its
application fosters the underlying goals of the Bankruptcy Code.
